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Abstract. We model how quality concerns affect the relationship between a firm and its
supplier. A firm concerned about uncontractible quality for a customizable good has to pay
higher prices to sustain a relationship with the supplier. If the customizable good has
sufficiently volatile demand, then a contract that includes a constant unit price premium
only for this good cannot be sustained. Instead, the downstream firm pays a premium both
for the customizable good and also for a good with more stable demand that is correlated
with the demand for the customizable good. Our results imply that a supplier of cus-
tomized goods should also supply other products, which can include goods that do not
require customization, and both the supplier and buyer benefit from the greater pricing
flexibility they achieve by trading multiple goods.
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1. Introduction
Many business transactions involve complex agree-
ments that would be difficult to enforce with a formal
contract. In this context, relationships become crucial: the
value of the future transactions gives each party in a re-
lationship an incentive to perform at a level beyond that
which would be possible to enforce in a formal contract.
For example, suppliers of high-end restaurants
often customize food ingredients to meet the partic-
ular needs of each restaurant they serve.1 Writing
down precise details such as the storage temperature
or the cut of each ingredient would require a long,
complex contract that a court might find practically
difficult to enforce. However, if a supplier has an
ongoing relationship with a restaurant, the two firms
can establish an informal agreement that the supplier
will make reasonable effort to satisfy the restaurant’s
requests, and in return, the restaurant will pay the
supplier a price premium over market rates for its
ingredients. As long as the value of the relationship to
each party exceeds the cost of the additional effort or
payments they make, the relationship is sustainable.
This paper formulates amodel of payment schemes
thatwill sustain a relationship between a supplier and
its downstream partner at efficient quality levels. Our
model is a repeated game in which a supplier sells
multiple goods to a downstream firm. In each period,
the supplier can add a dimension of quality, such as
product customization, to one of the goods. However,
firms cannot implement formal contracts in which
payment is contingent on product quality, for ex-
ample, because it would be too difficult for firms to
specify and for courts to enforce such contracts (Iyer
and Villas-Boas 2003). We show how channel mem-
bers can use relational contracts (Baker et al. 2002) to
sustain these uncontractible services. The supplier’s
desire to sustain the relationship provides an incen-
tive to exert effort. Furthermore, the downstream
player pays higher wholesale prices than offered on
the outside market in order to reward the supplier’s
past effort and sustain the relationship.
Ourmodel focuses on the empirically common case
of industries with unit prices that remain stable
over time. Previous research has documented several
reasons for stable prices, including price adjustment
costs that are large enough to discourage frequent
price changes (Zbaracki et al. 2004, Levy et al. 2010,
Maciejovsky and Wernerfelt 2011) and fairness con-
cerns that also compel the firm not to vary prices over
time (Anderson and Simester 2010, Selove 2019).
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We show how firms in a supply relationship can set
prices for multiple goods to achieve pricing flexibility
without needing to adjust prices as demand fluctuates.
We then extend our model (in Section 3.4) to allow for
costly adjustments to the total payment in agivenperiod; in
this case, firms would like to set per-unit prices that gen-
erate optimal payments during the most likely states of
demandand incuradjustment costsduring less likelystates.
If some goods are customizable and some are not,
we might expect that the most efficient relation-
ship (i.e., the relationship that generates the greatest
possible surplus) would set a price premium only on
the customizable goods to reflect the greater value
of effort in times of high demand for these goods.
However, if demand for the customizable goods is
very volatile, this creates a problem.When demand is
very high, the premium payment the retailer is re-
quired to make may be so high that it exceeds the
value of the effort that the supplier is willing to exert
given the (future) value of the relationship.
Firms face a dilemma between wanting to provide
higher total premium payments to reflect the greater
value of effort in times of high demand and, at the same
time, not wanting to require unsustainable premium
payments or unsustainable effort levels during those
periods. We show that in some cases, setting price
premiums on both a customizable good and a non-
customizable good can help resolve this dilemma. If
demand for different types of goods is correlated, but
demand for noncustomizable goods is less volatile, then a
price premium on noncustomizable goods can serve the
dual role of providing the supplierwith higher rewards in
times of high demand while still limiting the spikes in
these payments to a range that is acceptable to the retailer.
We interviewed a sales manager for a distributor that
supplies fish, rice, and other inputs to sushi restaurants.
The manager told us that some restaurants require fre-
quent customization of fish. He considers them good
clientswhowill paymore overall as they give himmore fu-
ture business and buy other products from his company.
The manager provided us with a list of restaurants’
requests, for example, for fish to be “clean and white,
please” or for a specific size and cut of fish (“half loin,
please, front part” or for “15 lb back loin, head part,
please !!!!!”) or even for how frozen the items should
be (“Be super frozen tuna saku—1bag BIGG” or “2 lb
not super frozen”). See Table 1 for a list of all cus-
tomizable products sold by the distributor during an
11-month period. Instead of using formal contracts to
ensure these requests are satisfied, the manager said
he was responsible for maintaining informal personal
relationshipswith restaurant owners, who arewilling
to pay premium prices if the supplier consistently
provides customized ingredients.
The sushi supply manager we interviewed said
that restaurants that require frequent customization
of fish typically buy multiple different products from
the supplier. Some of these restaurants pay a price
premium on customized products such as salmon, some
pay a premium on both customized and noncustomized
products, and some actually compensate the supplier
mostly with a price premium on noncustomized prod-
ucts such a rice or seaweed. For an example of two
products that exhibit this pattern, please see Online
AppendixA. This pricing arrangement is consistentwith
our model, because products such as fresh fish have
volatile demands, so any payment scheme linked only to
the actual product being customizedmight not be able to
sustain the relational contract that provides the cus-
tomization effort. By contrast, dry products such as rice
or seaweed are relatively stable goods that are perfect for
servingasabasis for thepremiumpayment to sustain the
relational contract. Thus, our model provides one pos-
sible explanation for cross-subsidized pricing, in which
some restaurants that require customization of their fish
might pay a premium price for rice.
Arrow Electronics is another example of a company
that uses this type of pricing structure to sustain a
relationship with its customers. The company is a
distributor of two types of microchips: standard
commodity chips and value-added chips the company
customizes for each client. The latter type of products
requires effort investment by Arrow. The company
forms relationships with clients who need custom-
ization, and these clients do not pay a price premium
for value-added products that are customized but
instead pay higher margins on the standard chips.2 If
these customers go to the outside market for the
commodity products, their relationship with Arrow
typically ends (Narayandas 1998).
In our model, prices and effort levels in an efficient
relationship depend on the amount of surplus gen-
erated bymarginal effort (the surplus generated is the
buyer’s per-unit benefit of effort minus the supplier’s
per-unit cost of effort). If effort generates a moderate
amount of surplus (surplus is not too low or too high),
firms can sustain a relationship, but they cannot sustain
maximumeffortduring largedemandspikes.Therefore, a
price premium only on the customizable good is not
sustainable because it would lead to payment spikes that
exceed the value of effort during high demand.3
In such cases, we show that the most efficient re-
lationship sets a price premium onmultiple goods or,
in some cases, only on a noncustomizable good with
relatively stable demand to achieve the precise pay-
ment level during each demand state that equals the
value of sustainable effort during that demand state.
As the volatility of the customizable good increases,
firms need to shift more of the price premium from
this volatile good to a more stable good in order to
maintain a given difference in the total premium
payment between high- and low-demand states.4
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We also present model extensions in which it is not
possible to choose prices that always generate the
desiredpayment levels, and insteadfirms incur payment
adjustment costs during certain periods (Section 3.4) or
split their order quantity between their main supplier
and the outside market to limit payment spikes during
high demand (Section 3.5).
Our model implies that contracts become more
efficient when firms have more instruments available
tomatch their desired payment levels in each demand
state. Therefore, firms would generally like to use all
available pricing instruments if there is no additional
transaction cost to doing so. For example, if firms can
include a fixed-payment component, similar to two-
part tariffs, then doing so makes their contract more
efficient. However, we show (Section 3.6) that two-
part tariffs do not eliminate the benefit of also setting a
per-unit price premium on multiple goods. In par-
ticular, if there are more than two possible quantity
levels for the customizable good, then a two-part
tariff does not allow firms to set payment levels
that increase linearly up to a certain quantity and then
become less sensitive to quantity above that level. In
such cases, firms can use per-unit price premiums on
multiple goods to provide additional degrees of freedom
in determining the total payment in each period.
An important implication of our model is that
trading multiple goods can increase equilibrium profits
for both firms by allowing more flexible payment ar-
rangements than would be possible if they traded only
the customizable good. Therefore, a supplier that pro-
vides customized goodsmaywant to offer a full product
line, including goods that do not require customization.
Buyers that require customization thenhavean incentive
to purchase all their goods from the same supplier, and
both firms can benefit from this arrangement.
Section 2 reviews related literature. Section 3 presents
the theoretical model. Section 4 concludes with im-
plications for channel management and directions
for future research. Online Appendix A contains an
Table 1. Customizable Items
Product name Percent of total orders Percent of customized orders
Frozen Scottish Whole Salmon 9.09 27.64
Y/F Tuna Loin 3.68 11.20
Fluke (Hirame) 2.64 8.03
Farm Rock 2.53 7.69
Frozen Escolar Block 2.20 6.70
California Uni 1.83 5.56
Frozen Smoked Salmon Chunk 1.81 5.51
Frozen Hamachi Fillet 1.66 5.06
(Frozen) Scottish Salmon Fillet for Sushi 0.85 2.60
Big Eye Tuna Loin 0.78 2.38
Frozen Hamachi Loin Farm Japan 0.55 1.69
Asi Beff Gyoza 0.51 1.55
Mushidako Octopus 0.49 1.48
Fresh Hamachi Fillet (Japan) 0.43 1.30
Aji 0.43 1.29
Frozen Albacore Tuna Loin 0.42 1.28
Frozen Escolar Block 0.41 1.25
Live Mirugai (Geoduck) 0.41 1.23
Madai (Japan) 0.29 0.87
Fresh Kanpachi Fillet 0.24 0.73
Unagi 0.24 0.72
Spanish Mackeral (USA) 0.23 0.69
OO-Toro Southern Blufin 0.22 0.68
Atlantic Whole Salmon (Farm Raised) 0.21 0.62
Tuna Ground 0.20 0.61
Apex Y/F Tuna Saku AAA 0.14 0.43
Blue Fin O-Toro 0.13 0.40
YF Tuna Loin 0.10 0.29
Bluefin Tuna Loin 0.08 0.25
BE Super Frozen Tuna Saku 0.03 0.10
Y/F. Tuna Loin 0.02 0.07
Chillian Sea Bass 0.02 0.06
BF Frozen O-Toro (Saku) 0.01 0.03
Awabi (Abalone) 0.00 0.01
Y/F Super Frozen Tuna Saku 0.00 0.01
Overall customized 32.87 100.00
Note. Based on sales data and customization requests from a supplier of sushi restaurants in the
southeastern United States, April 2010–February 2011.
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example from a supplier of sushi restaurants. Online
Appendix B contains formal proofs of all results.
2. Related Literature
There is a growing theoretical literature on relational
contracts (Baker et al. 2002, Levin 2003, Gibbons 2005,
Plambeck and Taylor 2006, Halac 2012, Li and
Matouschek 2013, Halac 2015). Experimental and
empirical research has also documented how rela-
tional contracts can ensure reliable product supply
(Brown et al. 2004, Macchiavello and Morjaria 2015).
A key finding of this literature is that discretionary
payments can never become too large or the principal
would violate the contract, and effort specified in the
contract can never become too large or the agent
would violate the contract. However, standard the-
oretical models of relational contracts assume that
bonus payments are a general function of observed
performance outcomes (e.g., Levin 2003). Such models
do not allow meaningful analysis of cross-subsidized
pricing. These models typically assume that there is
only one task or product. Also, because they assume
that payments can be a general function of outcomes
for a task that requires effort, the principal does not
pay a per-unit price premium for the task but instead
offers a general bonus. By contrast, our model in-
cludes two products and a more realistic payment
mechanism with constant per-unit prices that is com-
monly used in practice (Schmalensee 1989).
Consistent with our modeling assumptions, pre-
vious research has documented reasons why unit
prices tend to remain constant even during demand
fluctuations. Zbaracki et al. (2004) measure the costs
of adjusting prices in a business-to-business (B2B)
setting, finding large managerial costs of gathering
information and communicating about price changes
with the client. These costs of adjusting prices are a
significant portion of the revenue and act as a de-
terrent toward changing prices too often or employing
complicated pricing schemes. Moreover, Levy et al.
(2010) show that prices remain rigid even during
large demand spikes because of the opportunity cost
of adjusting prices during these busy times. Labo-
ratory experiments confirm that to avoid the imple-
mentation costs of dynamic pricing, subjects prefer to
agree on a single price for multiple rounds of trad-
ing, even when doing so leads to some inefficient
trades (Maciejovsky and Wernerfelt 2011). Previous
research has also shown that fairness concerns can
lead managers to set stable prices in order to avoid
imposing disutilty from unfairness on customers who
might pay elevated prices during periods of high
demand (Anderson and Simester 2010, Selove 2019).
Our paper uses an infinitely repeated game in the
style of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), Abreu (1988),
Lal (1990), DechenauxandKovenock (2007), Thomadsen
and Bhardwaj (2011), and Piccolo and Miklos-Thal
(2012). Like these earlier papers, we derive conditions
in which repeated interactions enable firms to cooperate
in equilibrium. By applying this framework to the
problem of pricing and quality provision in a channel
with multiple products, we generate new insights
about the optimal pricing tactics that make coopera-
tion sustainable, including cross-subsidized pricing.
Unlike papers on folk theorem results, we do not focus
on cases in which the discount factors approach one,
and therefore, it is not generally the case in our model
that any outcome better than each firm’s worst-case
payoff is sustainable. As is standard in the theory on
relational contracts (e.g., Baker et al. 2002, Levin 2003)
and most other theory papers on repeated interac-
tions (e.g., Rotemberg and Saloner 1986), we derive
the most efficient sustainable equilibrium for dis-
count factors that do not approach one.
Previous theory on bundling and tying has devel-
opedmodels in which amonopolist requires customers
who wish to purchase one product to also buy another
product from the firm as an anticompetitive measure
(Whinston 1990, Rey and Tirole 2007) or to extract
more surplus from consumers (Bakos and Brynjolfsson
1999). Our model involves a different and, in some
sense, opposite motivation for multiproduct rela-
tionships comparedwith this earlier literature. Rather
than the supplier leveraging power over a price-
taking customer to the detriment of the customer,
firms in our model agree to prices that help to ensure
that a long-standing and mutually valuable rela-
tionship persists while providing the strongest pos-
sible incentives for the supplier to exert effort that
benefits the customer. Also, in ourmodel, the supplier
would not need to implement a formal legal re-
quirement for customers to buy multiple products
because the threat of reduced supplier effort provides
an incentive for the downstream firm to buy multiple
products from the supplier.
Literature on product line pricing has studied op-
timal priceswhen products are either complements or
substitutes (Reibstein and Gatignon 1984, Dobson
and Kalish 1988, Belloni et al. 2008). Our paper fo-
cuses on a different aspect of product line pricing.
The goods in our model are neither substitutes nor
complements on the demand side. Rather, firms agree
on prices for multiple products that help sustain a
reliable supply relationshipwith the greatest possible
effort. Optimal prices in our model depend on the
degree of volatility of demand for each good over
time. If demand for the customizable good is suffi-
ciently volatile, the downstream firm pays a premium
both on that good and also on a basic good with more
stable demand.
Bargaining as a mechanism of setting wholesale
prices has been analyzed in Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003).
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Our paper studies a different mechanism for sustaining
effort, by allowing infinitely repeated interactions that
make relational contracts possible. Another related
stream of literature studies how information asymme-
tries affect channel partners (Jeuland and Shugan 1983,
Desiraju and Moorthy 1997, Shaffer and Zettelmeyer
2002, Corbett et al. 2004, Busse et al. 2006, Guo and
Iyer 2010). Our paper assumes that all parties in the
channel have the same information about demand,
costs and each other’s types.
Themarketing literature also has a long tradition of
studying relationships and their importance in B2B
environments, studying characteristics of how such
relationships influence transactions (Spekman et al.
1998, Jap 1999, Ghosh et al. 2006, Shervani et al. 2007,
Tuli et al. 2007, 2010). Our paper contributes to this
literature by formulating a theoretical model of re-
peated interactions that provides insights into the
mechanism behind prices and quality in channel
relationships.
3. Theoretical Model
The model has two risk-neutral players: a manufac-
turer and a retailer. The upstream firm can sell two
goods to the downstream firm. Good 1 is a custom-
izable good, the value of which increases if the seller
invests (noncontractible) effort into customizing it for
the retailer. Good 2 is a basic good that cannot be
customized. The players trade repeatedly at dates
t  0, 1, 2 . . .. Let good 1, which has an uncontractible
quality dimension, be denoted by subscript u, whereas
the basic good (good 2) is denoted by b.
On-time delivery, consistent good customer ser-
vice, personal help, and even customized improve-
ments to the physical good are possible examples of
quality dimensions that may be uncontractible or
unknown, as in Iyer andVillas-Boas (2003), at the time
the bargaining process over prices takes place. The
model allows for these uncontractible quality di-
mensions to be quite general; it suffices that a formal
contract may be hard to enforce or hard to specify or
costly to monitor for the results to be valid.
The firms find it impossible to write completely
enforceable contracts because of the complexity of the
transactions (for example), but their desire to con-
tinue to do business with each other in the future acts
as an incentive to maintain a relational contract.
Under certain conditions, this relationship is self-
enforcing and leads to optimal quality for the buyer
because both parties fear the loss of future benefits if
they deviate from cooperating.
As is standard in the relational contracting litera-
ture (e.g., Baker et al. 2002, Levin 2003), including
models of supply relationships (Macchiavello and
Morjaria 2015, Andrews and Barron 2016), we ab-
stract away from modeling the downstream firm’s
customer demand. Rather, we assume that the re-
tailer needs quantities qt,u and qt,b of goods 1 and 2,
respectively, in period t. These amounts vary ran-
domly fromperiod to period, andwe allow for qt,u and
qt,b to be correlated in each period, with joint distri-
bution F(qt,u, qt,b) that is independent and identical
across time periods. For now, the only other restriction
we place on these distributions is that they are bounded,
so there is amaximumpossible quantity of each product.
We later analyze the model for specific quantity distri-
butions that allow us to explicitly derive optimal con-
tracts that include a price premium on both products.
The downstream firm’s utility from buying from
the seller at time t is given by
URt  qt,u αu + βet − Pt,u
( ) + qt,b αb − Pt,b( ), (1)
with et the noncontractible effort per unit put in by the
seller at time t, where et ∈ [0, 1]. Setting et  1 implies
that the supplier fully meets all the customization
needs of the retailer for period t, whereas et < 1 im-
plies that these needs are not fully met. Here β is the
per-unit benefit of the customization effort to the
retailer, Pt,u and Pt,b are the unit prices at time t, and αu
and αb are constants.
The seller’s utility from selling to the retailer at time t
is given by
USt  qt,u Pt,u − γet
( ) + qt,bPt,b, (2)
with γ being the per-unit cost of effort, where β > γ > 0,
so the benefit to the retailer of customization effort
exceeds the cost to the supplier.5 Note that optimal
effort for maximizing total channel profits is given by
et  1 in each period. This is the optimal per-unit ef-
fort, which implies that optimal total effort costs for
the seller are higher when quantity qt,u is high. We
have assumed linear effort costs, similar to Bond and
Gomes (2009) and Ludwig et al. (2011), so that we can
explicitly derive the maximum sustainable effort and the
efficient price levels for particular demand distributions.
Both firms have the option to buy or sell the goods
on the outside market at unit prices P̄u and P̄b, where
αu > P̄u > 0 and αb > P̄b > 0. This outside option does
not provide customization to the retailer and does not
reward the supplier for the effort expended on cus-
tomization. For example, the outside market may
consist of low-end retailers who do not value cus-
tomization and low-end suppliers who cannot serve
customization requests in a cost-effective manner.
Thus, for periods in which they trade on the outside
market, the players utilities are given by6
URt  qt,u αu − P̄u
( )
+ qt,b αb − P̄b
( )
, (3)
USt  qt,uP̄u + qt,bP̄b. (4)
In each period, the buyer can buy either from the
seller or from the outside market, but not from both.
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We later present a model extension that does allow
the buyer to split its order for a period between dif-
ferent suppliers if it incurs an additional transac-
tion cost.
The retailer wants to maximize
∑∞
t0 δtURt , whereas
the supplier wants to maximize
∑∞
t0 δtUSt , where
each firm’s discount factor is denoted by δ ∈ (0, 1).
3.1. Timing
The parties initially agree on a pair of prices (Pu,Pb) for
the goods. These prices can be greater than, equal to,
or less than the outside market prices for the goods.
The prices that the firms initially choose remain
constant over the course of their relationship. The
restriction to contracts with constant unit prices,
which is commonly found in many industries, has
been justifiedon the grounds of simplicity (Schmalensee
1989). One way to interpret the constant-unit-prices
assumption is that there are often costs to adjusting
unit prices (Levy et al. 1997, Zbaracki et al. 2004). The
results in this paper show how firms can set prices of
two different goods to achieve some flexibility in their
pricing without the need to incur such price adjust-
ment costs.7 We later present a model extension in
which firms can agree on a different payment level
for a given period than the one implied by their ini-
tial agreement if they incur an adjustment cost in
that period.
After the players agree to prices for each good, they
have the option to trade at times t  0, 1, 2, . . .based on
this contract. At each time t, the game has three stages:
1. Nature draws qt,u and qt,b, and the buyer and the
seller observe this demand for that particular period.
2. The buyer can either agree to pay the unit prices
from the relational contract Pu and Pb, or it can go to
the outside market, which offers P̄u and P̄b.
3. The seller decides how much effort to put into
providing the service et. The buyer observes this choice.
Note that the buyer commits to a payment before
observing the seller’s effort level. Therefore, the seller
has an opportunity to shirk on the contract by accepting
payment for the goods while providing less effort than
agreed by the relational contract.8 If effort levels were
legally enforceable, then the parties could always
achieve optimal effort with a formal contract, and a
relational contract would not be necessary.
3.2. Results
Asubgameperfect equilibrium,whichwe also refer to
as a relationship or relational contract, consists of an
initial pair of prices and strategies for each player
after each possible history such that neither firm has a
profitable deviation after any history. We define an
equilibrium as efficient if it generates weakly greater
total surplus than any other equilibrium, that is, if it
maximizes the equilibrium value of the following:
E
∑∞
t0
δt URt +USt
( )[ ]
. (5)
We will also say that one relational contract is more
efficient than another if the former contract generates
greater surplus than the latter. In principle, for any
equilibrium that maximizes this surplus generated,
firms could divide the surplus in any manner they
choose with an initial lump-sum transfer between the
players, as shown by Levin (2003).
In our model, all actions are observable by both
players, so it is common knowledge whether either
player has ever deviated from the equilibrium path.
We will focus on equilibria in which, if either player
deviates, firms never trade with each other again,
which provides the strongest possible incentives for
players to follow their equilibrium strategy (Abreu
1988, Levin 2003).9 In particular, because effort is
observable in our model, temporary punishments are
not necessary in equilibrium. In this respect, our
model is similar to the repeated-game model with
perfect monitoring by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986)
and different from the models of imperfect monitoring
by Green and Porter (1984) and Abreu et al. (1990).
Our formal propositions derive conditions inwhich
it is efficient for firms to trade with each other during
all periods.10 We first show that for such equilibria, it
is efficient to set effort levels that depend only on the
current quantity of the customizable good. Such re-
lationships represent what Levin (2003) defines as a
“stationary contract,” with effort and payment levels
on the equilibrium path that depend only on the
current period’s product quantities.
Lemma 1. If there exists an equilibrium in which firms
always trade with each other, then the most efficient such
equilibrium has effort levels et  e(qt,u) that depend only on
the current quantity of the customizable good.
We now derive conditions for both the supplier and
the retailer to stay in a relationship in which they trade
with each other during all periods.
At any time t, the utility for the buyer if it stays in
the relationship is given by its utility in the present
period added to the discounted stream of utilities it
gets in the future while it is in the relationship:
qt,u αu + βet − Pu( ) + qt,b αb − Pb( ) + ∑∞
Tt+1
δ T−t( )
× E qT,u αu + βeT − Pu( ) + qT,b αb − Pb( )[ ], (6)
where et and eT are current and future supplier effort
levels based on the relational contract.
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By contrast, if the buyer deviates and goes to the
outside market, the relationship will end. In this case,
prices in this period and all future periods will be P̄u
and P̄b, and effort will be zero in the current period
and all future periods. Thus, the buyer’s utility if it
deviates at any time t is given by
qt,u αu − P̄u
( )
+ qt,b αb − P̄b
( )
+ ∑∞
Tt+1
δ T−t( ) E qT,u αu − P̄u
( )[
+ qT,b αb − P̄b
( )]
. (7)
By comparing expressions (6) and (7) and rearranging
terms, we see that the buyer will always want to stay
in the relationship if at each time t:
Pu − P̄u( ) qt,u + δ1− δE qT,u[ ]
( )
+ Pb − P̄b
( )
× qt,b + δ1− δE qT,b
[ ]( )≤β qt,uet+ δ1− δE qT,ueT[ ]
( )
. (8)
Intuitively, the present value of all the premium
payments the retailer makes must be less than the
present value of the benefits it receives because of
the supplier’s higher effort for the relationship to
be sustainable.
The utility for the supplier if it stays in the rela-
tionship at any time t is
qt,u Pu−γet( )+qt,bPb+ ∑∞
Tt+1
δ T−t( )E qT,u Pu−γeT( )+ qT,bPb[ ].
(9)
By contrast, if the supplier deviates and provides
lower effort than specified in the relational con-
tract, the relationship ends, and the supplier only re-
ceives prices P̄u and P̄b in all future periods. There-
fore, at any time t, the supplier’s utility, if it deviates
and provides zero effort, is
qt,uPu + qt,bPb +
∑∞
Tt+1
δ T−t( )E qT,uP̄u + qT,bP̄b
[ ]
. (10)
By comparing expressions (9) and (10) and rear-
ranging terms, we see that the supplier will always
want to stay in the relationship if at each time t
Pu − P̄u( ) δ1 − δE qT,u[ ] + Pb − P̄b( ) δ1 − δE qT,b[ ]
≥ γ qt,uet + δ1 − δE qT,ueT
[ ]( )
. (11)
Intuitively, the present value of the premium pay-
ments the supplier receives in all future periods must
be greater than the present value of its cost of effort in
the current period and all future periods for the
supplier to stay in the relationship.
We are interested in conditions in which firms can
design a more efficient contract if they trade two
goods with a price premium on both goods instead of
placing a price premium only on the customizable
good. In fact, we will now derive conditions in which
there is no sustainable relationship in which firms
always trade with each other with a price premium
only on the customizable good. Formally, if we allow
Pu − P̄u > 0 but impose the constraint Pb − P̄b  0, then
the buyer’s condition to stay in the relationship, given
by (8), becomes
Pu − P̄u( ) qt,u + δ1 − δE qT,u[ ]
( )
≤ β qt,uet + δ1 − δE qT,ueT
[ ]( )
.
(12)
The seller’s incentive condition to stay in the rela-
tionship, given by (11), becomes
γ qt,uet + δ1 − δE qT,ueT
[ ]( ) ≤ Pu − P̄u( ) δ1 − δE qT,u[ ]. (13)
Multiplying both sides of (12) by γPu−P̄u and both sides
of (13) by β
Pu−P̄u and combining these two constraints
imply that the following must hold:
γ qt,u + δ1 − δE qT,u
[ ]( ) ≤ β δ
1 − δE qT,u
[ ]
. (14)
Rearranging terms shows that this condition cannot
hold during periods of peak demand of the custom-
izable good, that is, when qt,u  max(qt,u), if the fol-
lowing is true:
γmax qt,u
( )
> β − γ( ) δ
1 − δE qT,u
[ ]
. (15)
Therefore, if (15) holds, then it is not possible for both
(8) and (11) to hold during all periods for any rela-
tional contract that has a price premium on the cus-
tomizable good but not on the basic good.
Intuitively, if (15) holds, then demand spikes for the
customizable good are so large that it is not possible to
sustain optimal effort (et  1) during periods with the
highest demand for this good. Therefore, the pre-
mium payment during such periods must be lowered
to reflect the seller’s actual effort level during peak
demand to induce the buyer to make this payment.
However, if we constrain the contract to include a
price premium only on the customizable good (and not
on the basic good), then reducing the payment during
peak demand proportionally reduces the payment
level during other periods, resulting in even weaker
effort incentives, which require an additional pay-
ment reduction during peak demand to reflect the
lowered effort levels, and so on, until any potential
contract unravels.
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Proposition 1. If inequality (15) holds, then it is not
possible to sustain any relationship in which firms always
trade with each other with a price premium only on the
customizable good. By contrast, if inequality (15) is reversed,
firms can sustain optimal effort (et  1) during all periods
with a price premium only on the customizable good.
The next step in the analysis is to identify an ar-
rangement that gives both the seller and the buyer the
appropriate incentives to sustain a relational contract
during all periods when condition (15) holds. We will
now derive an efficient contract that includes premium
payments on both goods instead of only on the cus-
tomizable good. To illustrate how this can occur, and to
allow us to explicitly derive the most efficient contract,
we assume that the quantities traded for each product
have the following distribution:
Prob qt,u  L, qt,b  L
( )  1 − ω, (16)
Prob qt,u  Hu, qt,b  Hb
( )  ω, (17)
where 0 < L < Hb < Hu andω ∈ (0, 1). Note that we are
assuming that demand for the goods is perfectly
correlated and that there are only two possible states
of demand in each period: one state in which both
goods have low demand and another state in which
both goods have relatively high demand. In the next
two sections of this paper, we present extensions that
allow demand for the two goods to be uncorrelated or
imperfectly correlated. For notational simplicity, we
have also normalized demand for the two goods to be
equal (qt,u  qt,b  L) in the low condition. However,
this assumption could be relaxed, and the prices for
the basic good could be scaled accordingly to produce
equivalent results.
We assume that the high-demand quantity for
the customizable good is large enough to satisfy
the following:
γHu > β − γ( ) δ1 − δ
( )
1 − ω( )L + ωHu[ ]. (18)
Note that (18) is equivalent to (15) for this demand
distribution. If inequality (18) were reversed, then the
second part of Proposition 1 would imply that firms
can sustain an efficient relationship with a price
premium only on the customizable good.
We also assume that firms are patient enough that
the following holds:
γ < β − γ( ) δ
1 − δ
( )
. (19)
If inequality (19) were reversed, then firms could not
sustain any relationship, even if the quantity for the
customizable good were constant.
When inequalities (18) and (19) both hold, we show
that the most efficient relationship includes a price
premium on both goods, and this relationship can be
sustained during all periods. We will now derive the
most efficient contract. This contract involves setting
et  1 during low demand and setting the maximum
sustainable effort, denoted e∗H, during high demand.
We will show that the optimal high-demand effort
level can be found by solving the following equation:
γHue∗H  β − γ
( ) δ
1 − δ 1 − ω( )L + ωHue
∗
H
[ ]
. (20)
When this equation holds, effort costs during high
demand equal the expected discounted value of the
relationship, so this effort level is sustainable. Note
that each side of (20) is a linear function of e∗H . Fur-
thermore, (19) implies that the left side of (20) is less
than the right side if we set e∗H  LHu, whereas (18)
implies that the left side of (20) is greater than the right
side if we set e∗H  1. Therefore, there is a unique value
of e∗H ∈ ( LHu , 1) that satisfies (20). By solving (20), we
find that
e∗H 
L
Hu
β − γ( ) δ1−δ 1 − ω( )
γ − β − γ( ) δ1−δ ω
[ ]
. (21)
Equation (21) gives the maximum sustainable per-
unit effort level during high demand. Note that e∗H is
increasing in the marginal benefit of effort (β) and the
weight that firms place on the future (represented by δ)
but decreasing in the marginal cost of effort (γ) and
the relative magnitude of high-demand quantity of
the customizable good (Hu).
Given two prices and two possible demand states,
the firms can design a contract with the precise total
payment it would like to set in each demand state.11
We show that the relational contract can sustain effort
et  1 during low demand and et  e∗H during high
demand by setting the following prices:
Pu − P̄u  Hue
∗
H −Hb
Hu −Hb
( )
β, (22)
Pb − P̄b  β − Pu − P̄u
( )
. (23)
As the maximum sustainable effort during high de-
mand (e∗H) falls, the contract shifts the price premium
toward the basic good; that is, Pu − P̄u decreases, and
Pb − P̄b increases by the same amount. As e∗H → HbHu, the
contract converges to placing the entire premium
payment on the basic good. By contrast, as e∗H → 1, the
contract converges to placing the entire premium
payment on the good with uncontractible quality.
Proposition 2. If the quantity distributions satisfy condi-
tions (18) and (19), then the most efficient relational contract
includes a price premium on the basic good, with low-
demand effort level et  1, high-demand effort level given
by (21), and prices given by (22) and (23).
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Intuitively, including a price premium on the more
stable, noncustomized good provides larger total pre-
miumpayments to the supplier in times of high demand
without letting the total premium payment grow so
large that the retailer would want to exit the relation-
ship. This same contract is not sustainable if the same
premium payment is placed only on the good with
uncontractible quality because the premiums become
more than the retailer is willing to pay during the large
spikes in quantity traded of this good.
Proposition 2 implies that if demand for the basic
good is volatile enough that the following condition
holds, then the efficient contract sets a negative price
premium on the customizable good:
γHb > β − γ
( ) δ
1 − δ
( )
1 − ω( )L + ωHb[ ]. (24)
Recall that Hu > Hb, which implies that demand for
the customizable goods is more volatile than for the
basic good even when (24) holds. In this case, both
goods have such volatile demand that a price premium
on just one good could not be sustained, and the efficient
contract involves a large positive premium for the rel-
atively less volatile (basic) good and a small negative
premium for themore volatile (customizable) good. This
contract matches the optimal payment level during both
low- and high-demand states. During high demand, the
small negative price premium on the customizable good
helps offset the increased premium payment that results
from greater demand for the basic good.
Corollary 1. If the conditions of Proposition 2 hold and
demand for the basic good is volatile enough that (24) holds,
then the efficient contract includes a positive price premium
for the basic good (Pb > P̄b) and a negative price premium for
the customizable good (Pu < P̄u).
Finally, we show that Proposition 2 implies that the
optimal contract converges to a contract with a price
premium only on the basic good (with no price pre-
mium on the customizable good) as the magnitude of
demand spikes for the customizable good grows.
Corollary 2. Starting with the conditions of Proposition 2
and letting the magnitude of demand spikes for the customizable
good grow (Hu → ∞), the optimal price premium on the cus-
tomizable good approaches zero ((Pu − P̄u) → 0), and the op-
timal price premium on the basic good approaches the mar-
ginal benefit of effort ((Pb − P̄b) → β).
As is standard in the theoretical contracting litera-
ture, we have focused on the most efficient contract in
terms of total surplus generated, without analyzing
how that surplus is shared between the players (see
Weitzman 1980, Bolton and Dewatripont 2005). In fact,
in our model, all the surplus goes to the supplier in
order to provide the strongest possible incentives for
supplier effort during high demand. In principle, firms
could split the surplus differently by using an initial
lump-sum transfer. For example, the supplier could offer
the retailer a one-time new customer discount on the first
payment as they begin their relationship. Because this
initial payment occurs before any effort by the supplier,
such a discount would not affect the supplier’s effort
incentives. Therefore, this slightlymodified version of the
relationship we have derived, with an initial lump-sum
transfer to the buyer, would also be sustainable.
3.3. Numerical Example
We now present a numerical example to help provide
more intuition for the results from the preceding
section. Table 2 presents the parameter values used
for the numerical example.
For this example, firms experience occasional de-
mand shocks: The parameter ω  0.1 indicates that
90% of time periods have low demand, whereas 10%
have high demand.We normalize low-demand quantity
of eachgood tofiveunits (L  5), andwe allow demand
for the basic good to double during high demand
(Hb  10), while demand for the customizable good
increases by an even greater amount (Hu ∈ [15, 40]).
The per-unit cost of effort is normalized to γ  1, and
the per-unit benefit of effort is greater than the cost
(β ∈ [1.1, 2.1]). Firms are patient enough to care about
futureperiodsbutnot infinitelypatient, soweset δ  0.8.
Figure 1 presents the optimal price policy as a
function of the per-unit benefit of effort and the high-
demand quantity of the customizable good. Holding
other parameters constant, an increase in the per-unit
benefit of effort (β) implies that the relationship
Table 2. Parameter Values Used in the Numerical Example
Value Description
ω  0.1 Probability of high demand in a given period
L  5 Quantity of each product during low demand
Hb  10 Quantity of basic good during high demand
Hu ∈ [15, 40] Quantity of customizable good during high demand (Figure 1, y-axis)
γ  1 Per-unit cost of effort
β ∈ [1.1, 2.1] Per-unit benefit of effort (Figure 1, x-axis)
δ  0.8 Each firm’s discount factor
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becomes more valuable, and therefore, high payment
and high effort levels are easier to sustain. By contrast,
an increase in the high-demand quantity of the cus-
tomizable good (Hu) implies that premium payments
on the customizable good have a larger increase
during high demand, and therefore, the firms may
need to shift part of the premium payment to the
basic good so that the total premium payment is al-
ways sustainable.
If the per-unit benefit of effort is too low (β < 1.25), it
is not possible to sustain any relationship. Formally, if
β is small enough that γ > (β − γ)( δ1−δ), then condition
(19) does not hold, and the average effort cost in any
possible relationship would exceed the value of main-
taining the relationship, so there is no payment structure
that can sustain any relationship.
For slightly higher values of the benefit of effort
(β ∈ [1.25, 1.45]), firms can sustain a relationship, but
this relationship is not valuable enough to sustain
effort cost γHb during high demand. In this case, a per-
unit premium of magnitude β on the basic good, with
no premium on the customizable good, would lead
to a payment spike during high demand that is too
large to sustain. Therefore, firms place a small neg-
ative price premium on the customizable good to
offset the payment spike on the basic good. Formally,
under the conditions of Proposition 2, and given β
small enough that (24) holds, Corollary 1 implies
that firms place a positive price premium on the
basic good but a negative premium on the custom-
izable good.
For higher values of the benefit of effort (β > 1.45),
the optimal price strategy depends on the magnitude
of the high-demand quantity of the customizable
good (Hu). If these demand spikes are large enough
that (15) holds, Proposition 2 implies that firms place
a positive price premium on both goods. By con-
trast, if Hu is small enough that (15) does not hold,
Proposition 1 implies that firms place a price pre-
mium only on the customizable good.12
3.4. Model Extension: Payment Adjustment Costs
In previous sections, firms agreed to a relational
contract with constant unit prices. Ideally, firms would
like to use such a contract, or other simple contracts, to
generate the optimal premium payment for every pos-
sible state ofdemand.However, if thenumberofpossible
states ofdemand is too large, itmaybe too complicated to
construct a contract that specifies the optimal payment
for every possible state of demand. In such cases, firms
could agree to a contract that generates optimal pay-
ments for the most likely states of demand while also
agreeing to negotiate a different premium payment than
the one specified by the contract during periods when
relatively unlikely states occur. In this section,we extend
our model to allow firms to negotiate a different pre-
miumpayment than the one implied by the unit prices in
their contract, if they incur an adjustment cost for
the period.
For example, suppose that firms agree to a contract
that includes a premium payment on both a basic
good and a customizable good. This contract may
yield optimal payments when the quantity of both
goods is low and when the quantity of both goods is
relatively high. However, the firms may want to
negotiate a lower total payment than the one implied
by these prices during periods when demand for the
basic good is high but demand for the customizable
good is low in order to reflect the relatively low value
of effort during such periods. Similarly, they may
want to negotiate a higher total payment than the one
implied by the contract’s prices during periods when
demand for the basic good is low but demand for the
customizable good is high.
More generally, if there are many possible states of
demand, and it is too complicated to construct a
contract that specifies the optimal payment for every
possible demand state, firms could set prices that
generate the optimal payment for the most likely
demand states while also reaching an understanding
of the types of situations in which they will deviate
from these prices. Formally, the relationship derived
in this model extension represents an incomplete
contract (Hart and Moore 1999).
We assume that firms initially agree to a relational
contract that specifies values (Pu,Pb) representing unit
prices for each good. However, in each period, we
allow firms to agree to a different payment than the
one implied by these prices, similar to the model of
procurement contract renegotiation by Bajari and
Tadelis (2001). In principle, we could allow firms to
negotiate new prices that continue to hold after the
adjustment. However, it is more efficient to negotiate a
one-time payment adjustment and then revert to the
Figure 1. (Color online) Price Strategy for an Efficient
Relationship
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original contract prices if the original prices were chosen
optimally for the given demand distributions.
The timing in each period is the following:
1. Nature draws qt,u and qt,b, and the buyer and the
seller observe this demand for that particular period.
2. The seller has the option, if it incurs an adjust-
ment cost d, of proposing an alternative bonus pay-
ment Bt (in excess of what the buyer would pay on the
outside market) for the current period, which can be
different from the bonus implied by the prices in the
relational contract.
3. If the seller has proposed such an alternative
payment, the buyer can either agree to make this
proposed payment or can go to the outside market. If
the seller has not proposed an alternative payment in
the current period, the buyer can either agree to pay
the unit prices specified in the relational contract or
can go to the outside market.
4. The seller decides how much effort et to put into
providing the service. The buyer observes this choice.
When the seller proposes and the buyer agrees to an
alternative bonus Bt, the buyer’s utility for the pe-
riod is
URt  qt,u αu + βet − P̄u
( ) + qt,b αb − P̄b( ) − Bt, (25)
and the seller’s utility for the period is
USt  qt,u P̄u − γet
( ) + qt,bP̄b + Bt − d, (26)
where the adjustment cost for the period is repre-
sented by d > 0.
We characterize subgame perfect equilibria based
on contract prices (Pu,Pb), an effort level for each
demand state, a set of demand states D for which the
seller will propose an alternative bonus, and the al-
ternative bonus payment B(qt,u, qt,b) for each demand
state (qt,u, qt,b) ∈ D. As before, there is a bad equilib-
rium in which the buyer always goes to the outside
market and the seller always invests zero effort, and
firms revert to this bad equilibrium if either party ever
deviates from the proposed equilibrium.
We now generalize the demand distribution used in
the final proposition of the preceding section, allowing
for imperfect correlation in product quantities. In par-
ticular, we assume that the quantities traded for each
product have the following distribution:
Prob qt,u  L, qt,b  L
( )  1 − ρ( ) 1 − ω( )2+ρ 1 − ω( ), (27)
Prob qt,u  L, qt,b  Hb
( )  1 − ρ( )ω 1 − ω( ), (28)
Prob qt,u  Hu, qt,b  L
( )  1 − ρ( )ω 1 − ω( ), (29)
Prob qt,u  Hu, qt,b  Hb
( )  1 − ρ( )ω2 + ρω, (30)
where 0 < L < Hb < Hu, ω ∈ (0, 0.5), and ρ ∈ [0, 1).13
For these distributions, each product has probability
(1 − ω) of having a low quantity and probability ω of
having a relatively high quantity. As in the preceding
section, we assume that the high-demand quantity for
the customizable good is large enough that (18) holds
and that firms are patient enough that (19) holds.
The parameter ρ reflects their strength of correla-
tion, with ρ  0 implying no correlation and ρ  1
implying perfect correlation. If the correlation in
product demands is sufficiently strong, then the two
most likely states are that both products have low
demand and that both products have relatively high
demand. In particular, states (L, L) and (Hu,Hb) are
each more likely than state (Hu, L) and more likely
than state (L,Hb) if the following holds:
ρ > max
−1 + 2ω
2ω
,
1 − 2ω
2 − 2ω
( )
. (31)
If the correlation in product quantities is strong
enough that this condition holds, an efficient contract
uses unit prices to generate optimal payments at
states (L, L) and (Hu,Hb), and firms make price ad-
justments at states (Hu,L) and (L,Hb). Furthermore,
we show that such a contract involves premium
payments on both the customizable good and the
basic good.
The derivations of this contract are similar to those
for Proposition 2. Condition (18) implies that effort
et  1 cannot be sustained during high demand. If the
adjustment cost d is sufficiently small, then the op-
timal contract involves setting et  1 during low de-
mand and et  e∗H during high demand, where the
maximum sustainable effort during high demand is
found by solving the following:
γHe∗H 
δ
1 − δ
( )
β − γ( ) 1 − ω( )L + ωHue∗H[ ][
− 2d 1 − ρ( )ω 1 − ω( )], (32)
where the term 2d(1 − ρ)ω(1 − ω) reflects expected
adjustment costs in each period, that is, the adjust-
ment cost d times the probability that one product has
low demand while the other has relatively high de-
mand. For sufficiently small d, conditions (18) and
(19) ensure that there is a value e∗H ∈ ( LHu , 1) that solves
this equation. Solving for e∗H, we find the following:
e∗H 
1
Hu
δ
1−δ β − γ
( )
1 − ω( )L − 2d 1 − ρ( )ω 1 − ω( )[ ]
γ − δ1−δ β − γ
( )
ω
[ ]
.
(33)
Note that the maximum sustainable effort during
high demand is decreasing in the adjustment cost d
and increasing the strength of product quantity cor-
relation ρ.
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As in Proposition 2, optimal prices as a function of
e∗H are given by the following:
Pu − P̄u  Hue
∗
H −Hb
Hu −Hb
( )
β, (34)
Pb − P̄b  β − Pu − P̄u
( )
. (35)
Firmsmake payment adjustments at states (Hu,L) and
(L,Hb), and the associated bonus payments are
B Hu,L( )  βHue∗H , (36)
B L,Hb( )  βL. (37)
Proposition 3. If d is sufficiently small and the quantity
distributions satisfy conditions (18), (19), and (31), then the
most efficient relational contract includes a premium payment
on the basic good, with low-demand effort level et  1, high-
demand effort level given by (33), unit prices given by (34)
and (35), and payment adjustments given by (36) and (37).
Thus, if there is a sufficiently strong correlation in
demand for a customizable good with very volatile
demand and a basic good with less volatile demand,
including a premium payment on both goods can
generate an optimal payment when demand for both
goods is low and when demand for both goods is
relatively high. The firms can then make costly pay-
ment adjustments when other less likely states occur.14
The stylized example in this section illustrates the more
general point that when the number of possible de-
mand states is too large for the contract to specify a
payment in every possible state, firms can use unit
prices on multiple goods to achieve some pricing
flexibility with a relatively simply contract.
3.5. Model Extension: Order Splitting
In this section, we allow the buyer to split its order in a
given period between the supplier and the outside
market if it incurs a transaction cost for the period. For
example, suppose that the buyer and supplier agree
to a contract that includes a premium payment on the
customizable good. During periods in which demand
for this good is particularly high, the buyer can buy a
fraction of its demand for the good from the outside
market to limit its total premium payment for the
period. Previous theoretical research on relational
contracts by Board (2011) and Andrews and Barron
(2016) shows that usingmultiple suppliers can reduce
their effort incentives because each supplier receives a
smaller share of future premium payments. By con-
trast, in our model with fixed linear prices, we show
that order splitting during high demand can actu-
ally help firms sustain a relationship with high effort
by limiting premium payments to a level that is ac-
ceptable to the buyer.
We assume that firms initially agree to a relational
contract that specifies values (Pu,Pb), representing
unit prices for each good. The timing in each period is
the following:
1. Nature draws qt,u and qt,b, and the buyer and the
seller observe this demand for that particular period.
2. As before, the buyer can buy all its goods from
the seller at the prices specified in the contract or can
buy all its goods from the outside market. Alterna-
tively, if it incurs transaction cost f , the buyer can
buy a fraction Ft,u of the customizable good and a
fraction Ft,b of the basic good from the seller at the
prices specified in the contract and buy the remaining
fractions 1 − Ft,u and 1 − Ft,b, respectively, from the
outside market, where the buyer can choose any Ft,u ∈
[0, 1] and Ft,b ∈ [0, 1].
3. The seller decides how much effort et to put into
providing the service. This effort applies only to the
quantity of the customizable good that the buyer pur-
chases from the seller, not from the outside market. The
buyer observes this choice.
When the buyer splits its order, the buyer’s utility
for the period is
URt  qt,u αu + Ft,uβet − Ft,uPu − 1 − Ft,u( )P̄u
[ ]
+ qt,b αb − Ft,bPb − 1 − Ft,b
( )
P̄b
[ ] − f . (38)
And the seller’s utility for the period is
USt  qt,u Ft,u Pu − γet
( ) + 1 − Ft,u( )P̄u[ ]
+ qt,b Ft,bPb + 1 − Ft,b
( )
P̄b
[ ]
. (39)
We characterize subgame perfect equilibria based on
contract prices (Pu,Pb), an effort level for each demand
state, and the buyer’s purchase decision (including
possible order splitting) for each demand state. Firms
revert to the bad equilibrium, inwhich the two parties
never trade with each other again, if either party ever
deviates from the proposed equilibrium.
As in the preceding section, the quantities traded
for the two goods have joint distribution given by
(27)–(30), andwe assume that conditions (18) and (19)
hold. We also assume that demand for the basic
product is not too volatile, so condition (24) does not
hold, which implies that the optimal contract derived
in previous sections involves a positive price pre-
mium on both goods. In this case, order splitting does
not allow the same flexibility as the payment ad-
justments modeled in the preceding section. Payment
adjustments allow the firm to increase or decrease the
premium payment in any given period. By contrast,
order splitting allows the firm to decrease its quantity
of each good purchased from the supplier in a period
but does not allow for an increase in quantitydemanded.
Therefore, a relationship such as the one derived in
the preceding section, with payment adjustments only
when one product has high demand but the other has
low demand, cannot be sustained using order splitting
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because such a relationship requires the flexibility for
both upward and downward adjustments.15
We show that the optimal contract with order
splitting does not involve a price premium on both
goods. Rather, the optimal contract involves a price
premium only on the customizable good, with order
splitting during high demand for this good and effort
et  1 during all periods. The following equation
states the buyer’s constraint for such a contract:
β − Pu + P̄u( ) HuFH,u + δ1 − δ
( )
ωHuFH,u(
[
+ 1 − ω( )L)
]
− f 1 + δ
1 − δ
( )
ω
[ ]
≥ 0, (40)
where FH,u denotes the share of the customizable good
purchased from the seller during high demand. The
first term on the left-hand side of (40) represents the
value of effort minus the price premiummultiplied by
the high-demand quantity plus the expected value of
all future quantities of the customizable good. The
second term reflects the order-splitting cost during
high demand plus the expected value of all future
order-splitting costs. The maximum price for which
this constraint holds is given by
Pu − P̄u  β − φf , (41)
where φ is defined as follows:
φ ≡ 1 +
δ
1−δ
( )
ω
HuFH,u + δ1−δ
( )
ωHuFH,u + 1 − ω( )L( ) . (42)
If order-splitting costs (f ) are sufficiently small, we
show that the optimal contract involves a price pre-
mium only on the customizable good, with order
splitting during high demand for this good and effort
et  1 during all periods. The fraction of the cus-
tomizable good purchased from the supplier during
high demand is found by solving the following:
γHuFH,u  δ1 − δ
( )
β − γ − φf( )[
× 1 − ω( )L + ωHuFH,u[ ]] . (43)
Inequality (18) ensures that the left-hand side of
this equation is greater than the right-hand side for
FH,u  1, whereas (19) ensures that for sufficiently
small f , the left-hand side is less than the right-hand
side for FH,u  LHu. Because both sides are continuous
functions of FH,u, there must be a value FH,u ∈ ( LHu , 1)
that solves this equation.16
Proposition 4. If order-splitting cost f is sufficiently small
and the quantity distributions satisfy (18) and (19) but not
(24), then the efficient relationship sets effort et  1 during
all periods, with no order splitting during low demand,
order splitting during high demand given by solving (43) for
FH,u, and a price premium only on the customizable
good Pu − P̄u  β − φf .
The following corollary compares the relative at-
tractiveness of order splitting and payment adjustments.
Corollary 3. If the conditions of Propositions 3 and 4 hold,
then payment adjustments are more efficient than order
splitting if 2d(1 − ρ)(1 − ω) < f .
Firms prefer a relationship with payment adjust-
ments if the correlation in product demands (ρ) is high,
in which case payment adjustments are rarely needed
because most periods involve either high demand for
both goods or low demand for both goods. Firms also
prefer payment adjustments if the probability of high
demand (ω) is high, in which case they would like to
avoid the need for order splitting during all the periods
with highdemand for the customizable good. By contrast,
firms tend to prefer a relationship with order splitting if
the correlation between product demands is low, the
probability of high demand is low, and the cost of order
splitting (f ) is less than the cost of payment adjustment (d).
3.6. Model Extension: Two-Part Tariffs
We now extend the model to allow contracts with a
fixed-payment component and per-unit prices, sim-
ilar to two-part tariffs. Although including a fixed
payment improves contract efficiency, we show that
fixed payments do not generally eliminate the benefit
of setting a per-unit price premium on both the basic
good and the customizable good. Firms can still use
per-unit price premiums on multiple goods to pro-
vide additional degrees of freedom in determining the
premium payment in each period. In the example in
this section, setting a price premium on both goods
allows for payments that increase up to a certain
quantity of the customizable good and then become
less sensitive to quantity above that level.
Formally, we allow firms to agree to a relational
contract that specifies values (y,Pu,Pb), where y is the
fixed-payment component, which can be either pos-
itive or negative (or zero). When the buyer agrees to
the payment specified in the relational contract, the
buyer’s utility for the period is
URt  qt,u αu + βet − Pu
( ) + qt,b αb − Pb( ) − y. (44)
And the seller’s utility for the period is
USt  qt,u Pu − γet
( ) + qt,bPb + y. (45)
Using a fixed payment and per-unit prices on two
products allows three degrees of freedom, which
generally allows firms to generate the exact premium
payment they would like in three different demand
states. To derive an efficient contract for this case, we
extend the demand distribution used in Proposition 2
to include three possible demand states. In particular,
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we assume that the quantities traded for each product
have the following distribution:
Prob qt,u  Lu, qt,b  Lb
( )  1 − ωM − ωH, (46)
Prob qt,u  Mu, qt,b  Lb +Mu − Lu
( )  ωM, (47)
Prob qt,u  Hu, qt,b  Lb +Mu − Lu
( )  ωH, (48)
where 0 < Lu < Mu < Hu, Lb > 0, ωM > 0, ωH > 0, and
ωM + ωH < 1. This distribution implies that both prod-
ucts exhibit an increase in quantity of Mu − Lu as they
move from the low-demand state to the medium-
demand state; however, the customizable good has
a further increase in quantity ofHu −Mu, whereas the
basic good has no further increase in quantity as they
move from the medium-demand state to the high-
demand state. Other distributions with three states
could be used to produce similar results, with appropriate
adjustments to the fixed payment and per-unit prices, as
long as each product’s quantity is not a perfectly linear
function of the other product’s quantity.
For simplicity of exposition, we have returned to
the assumption of the original model with perfect
correlation in demand between the products. In princi-
ple, one could allow imperfect correlation between the
products,withpayment adjustments or order splitting to
match the desired payment during some demand states,
as in the preceding model extensions.17
We focus on cases in which these distributions
satisfy the following conditions:
γHu > β − γ( ) δ1 − δ
( )
1 − ωM − ωH( )Lu[
+ωMMu + ωHHu], (49)
γMu < β − γ( ) δ1 − δ
( )
1 − ωM − ωH( )Lu[
+ ωM + ωH( )Mu]. (50)
Condition (49) implies that effort et  1 cannot be
sustained during high demand, but condition (50)
implies that effort et  1 can be sustained during both
low and medium demand. The optimal contract in-
volves setting et  1 during low andmedium demand
and setting et  e∗H during high demand, where the
maximum sustainable effort during high demand is
found by solving the following:
γHue∗H  β − γ
( ) δ
1 − δ
(
1 − ωM − ωH[ )Lu
+ωMMu + ωHHue∗H
]
. (51)
Conditions (49) and (50) ensure that there is a value
e∗H ∈ (MuHu ,1) that solves this equation. Solving for e∗H, wefind
e∗H 
1
Hu
β − γ( ) δ1−δ 1 − ωM − ωH( )Lu + ωMMu[ ]
γ − β − γ( ) δ1−δ ωH
[ ]
. (52)
The optimal per-unit prices and fixed payment that
sustain these effort levels are as follows:
Pu − P̄u  Hue
∗
H −Mu
Hu −Mu
( )
β, (53)
Pb − P̄b  β − Pu − P̄u
( )
, (54)
y  βLu − Pu − P̄u( )Lu − Pb − P̄b( )Lb. (55)
Proposition 5. If the quantity distributions satisfy condi-
tions (49) and (50), then the most efficient relational contract
includes a fixed payment and per-unit premium payments
on both goods, with low- and medium-demand effort levels
et  1, high-demand effort level given by (52), unit prices
given by (53) and (54), and the fixed payment given by (55).
Thus, even when the relational contract includes a
fixed-price component, it is generally optimal to include
a per-unit premium payment on both goods to achieve
additional pricing flexibility.
4. Conclusion
We develop a model in which a downstream firm pays
premium prices on the goods it purchases in order to
compensate its supplier for customization services that
are not enforceable through a formal contract. We show
that the payments that can sustain sucha relationship are
partially linked to goods with stable demand, even if
these goods are not customizable. Moreover, this rela-
tional contract ensures efficient provision of uncon-
tractible services for the customizable goods.
Our results provide one explanation for why firms
often use cross-subsidized pricing. In some cases, it is
efficient for afirm to pay a price premiumon one good
to compensate a supplier for effort expended on an-
other good. We show that this pricing strategy can
help channel members form a simple relational contract
thatprovidespriceflexibility to compensate suppliers for
greater effort during high demand without making the
total premium payment too large to sustain.
In particular, if marginal effort by the supplier
generates a moderate amount of surplus (surplus
generated is not too low or too high), then firms can
sustain a relationship, but they cannot sustain max-
imum effort during large demand spikes. In such
cases, a price premium only on the customizable good
would not be sustainable because it would lead to
payment spikes that exceed the value of effort during
high demand.We derive conditions inwhich themost
efficient relationship sets a price premiumonmultiple
goods so that the total premium payment during each
possible demand state equals the value of sustainable
effort in that demand state. As the volatility of the
customizable good increases, firms need to shift the
price premium away from this volatile good and
toward a more stable good to maintain a given
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difference in the total premium payment between
high- and low-demand states.
We do not explicitly model customer demand and
retail prices, which could lead to double marginali-
zation. Further research could explore relational con-
tracts as a tool to solve the problem of double margin-
alization. In addition, it would be interesting to explore
what happens if the retailer also can incur uncontractible
effort that increases sales and benefits the channel, so the
contract needs to provide effort incentives for bothfirms.
Future research could also model how firms initially
bargain over the terms of a relational contract. In our
model, formulating an efficient contract requires knowing
the supplier’s cost and the retailer’s benefit of effort
and the distribution of the retailer’s quantity needs.
Firmswould need to share such information to construct
a contract that sustains efficient effort while minimizing
payment adjustment costs. If each firm is concerned that
sharing such information weakens its bargaining posi-
tion, it would be interesting to study conditions inwhich
channel partners can overcome this challenge to for-
mulate an efficient contract (see Wernerfelt 2012).
Our research implies that partners should coop-
erate to formulate a relationship that maximizes joint
surplus while avoiding situations in which one party
has an incentive to violate the terms of the contract or
in which the parties need to make costly adjustments
to those terms. An important managerial implication
of our model is that a supplier offering a full product
line, including basic goods that do not require cus-
tomization, can increase profits for both firms in a
supply relationship. Trading multiple goods allows
more flexible payment arrangements, which allow
firms to sustain greater effort and higher total pre-
miumpayments thanwould be possible if the supplier
provided only a customizable good. The additional
surplus generated when firms trade both customizable
and basic goods implies that both firms in the relation-
ship can earn higher profits.
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Endnotes
1This example is based on a report by the International Foodservice
Distributors Association (Caldwell 2017).
2As stated by the company’s chief executive officer, “You would
expect that the customer pays us high prices for the value-added
services we provide. Well, that doesn’t happen. . . . We cross-sell our
other products to these customers by offering them significant breaks
on the value-add products in return for their commitment to buy the
book-and-ship products exclusively from us. In a way, in these re-
lationships the commodity products subsidize the specialty prod-
ucts” (Narayandas 1998, p. 8).
3 See Proposition 1 in Section 3.2 for additional detail.
4For example, if there are two products and two possible demand
states, then placing a large price premium on a product with volatile
demand implies a large difference in the total premium payment
between the high- and low-demand states. By contrast, placing a
smaller (or even negative) price premium on this volatile product,
with a larger premium on a more stable product, leads to a small
difference in the premium payment between the two demand states
(see the numerical example in Section 3.3 for more detail).
5Without loss of generality, we have set marginal production costs
equal to zero, so the only costs in the model are effort costs.
6The seller’s utility represents the profits generated from the units of
the goods it otherwise would have sold to the retailer if they had
traded with each other instead of on the outside market.
7Recall that for simplicity, we assume that outside market prices are
constant over time. If we instead allowed outside market prices to
vary over time, then results equivalent to ours would hold if we
allowed contracts with a constant per-unit price premium for each
product, that is, a constant price markup over market prices.
8Most of the theoretical literature on relational contracting assumes
that the agent decides effort before the principal decides the bonus
payment, in which case the principal can benefit from the effort but
then shirk on the bonus (e.g., Levin 2003). Using this alternative
timing assumption would not significantly affect our key results. We
believe that the timing assumption used in this paper, in which the
payment is decided before effort, is more realistic in the context of
supply chain relationships.
9There is a bad equilibrium in which the buyer always buys from the
outside market and the supplier always exerts zero effort.
10Our model also allows for the possibility of other equilibria in
which firms trade on the outside market during some periods, for
example, when the total premium payment specified in the contract
exceeds the buyer’s willingness to pay. Note that trading on the
outside market does not constitute punishment if it occurs on the
equilibrium path.
11 In the model extension that follows, there are four demand states
and two prices, so the firms sometimes need to incur an adjustment
cost to achieve their desired payment level.
12 If the benefit of effort is very large (β > 3.5), then condition (15) does
not hold for any value of Hu. In this case, firms can always sustain
optimal effort, and it is optimal to place a price premium only on the
customizable good even as Hu grows without bound.
13The assumption ω < 0.5 has no effect on the results in this section,
but larger values ω could change the optimal contract with order
splitting derived in the next section.
14By contrast, if the correlation in product demands is weak enough
that (31) is violated, there is an efficient contract that places a price
premium only on the customizable good and involves payment
adjustments either when demand for the customizable good is high
or when it is low, similar to the contract derived in the next section.
15By contrast, if (24) holds, the optimal contract from previous sec-
tions involves a positive price premium for the basic good but a
negative price premium for the customizable good. In this case, firms
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could use a contract like the one derived in the preceding section
because order splitting would allow both upward and downward
adjustments to the total payment given that the buyer could split its
order for either good.
16Because φ is a function of FH,u, there is not a simple closed-form
expression that solves (43) for FH,u. If there are multiple solutions,
then the greatest value of FH,u that solves (43) generates the greatest
surplus and is therefore efficient.
17Alternatively, if demand for products were not perfectly correlated,
firms could use the fixed payment and per-unit prices to match the
optimal payment during some states while trading on the outside
market or accepting suboptimal payment levels during other states.
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